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The Legality And Practicality Of Remote
Witness Testimony
Fredric Lederer
is Chancellor Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Legal and Court Technology, William
& Mary School of Law.This article was originally
prepared in a slightly different form for
distribution at the 2008 ABA Annual Meeting
as part of a Criminal Justice Section program of
the same name. He can be reached at filede@
wm.edu.
Fredric Lederer
Eventually, the question may be whether phy-
sical presence is really necessary at all.
Courts, government agencies, and law firms have used
videoconferencing for multiple purposes for many years.
Today, the confluence of greatly improved technology
at decreasing cost and increasing travel costs and diffi-
culty now make videoconferencing especially appealing.
Among other uses, videoconferencing can be employed
for:
" Law firm administration;
" Law firm hiring, as demonstrated by Law School
Connect. A joint effort by the Center for Legal and
Court Technology and Courtroom Connect, Law
School Connect provides videoconferencing to over
50 law schools so that students may be interviewed by
legal employers for summer and permanent positions.
See www.lawschoolconnect.com;
* Alternative dispute resolution and settlement;
" Remote appearances at pretrial matters, trials, ad-
ministrative hearings, and appeals; and
" Education and training.
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Deciding whether to use remote appearance tech-
nology requires familiarity with the technology and
its costs, the quality of use, and the legal, human,
and practical matters that accompany videoconfer-
encing. This article is designed to give you a basic
introduction to the topic. The Center for Legal and
Court Technology (CLCT) has been a pioneer in
the legal uses of video conferencing for many years,
and this article is based on that experience.
Although videoconferencing has been accepted
for many applications, the critical legal issue that
accompanies remote appearances is whether its
use by the prosecution in criminal cases to pres-
ent remote government witness testimony violates
the Confrontation Clause. I address general back-
ground as well as the general issue of remote testi-
mony of various kinds.
TECHNOLOGY - Much of the following is tak-
en in various forms from Fredric I. Lederer, The Po-
tential Use of Courtroom Technology in Major Terrorism
Cases, 12 Win. & Mary Bill Rts.J. 887 (2004) with
updating as appropriate. Modern video conferenc-
ing uses either ISDN (Integrated Services Digital
Network, which can be thought of as high band-
width telephone lines), or IP (Internet Protocol)
data connections. New high-end commercial level
equipment customarily has both connection capa-
bilities. In its most basic form, a single location-
to-location connection ("point-to-point") consists
at each end of a camera, microphone, and visual
display (e.g., TV screen), and the "codec" (the vid-
eo-conferencing hardware). Each end's equipment
must be connected to either an Internet connec-
tion or the ISDN connections. "Multi-point" con-
nections are possible, customarily with the use of
a "master control unit" (MCU) or the use of com-
mercial "bridging" services. CLCT is unique with
the potential capability of hosting five or more
independent concurrent video conferences in Wil-
liam & Mary's McGlothlin Courtroom.
Understanding the technology is not as impor-
tant as understanding its implications. Modern qual-
ity commercial videoconferencing presents a high-
quality image, fully synchronized with the audio.
In other words, a person's voice is fully coordinated
with lip movements. Subject to the availability of
the communication lines, equipment can be highly
portable. Commercial standard videoconferencing
does not use satellite technology and thus does not
need to originate in a television studio. We distin-
guish quality commercial technology from low-cost
computer-based conferencing that often has video
in a small window with the image sometimes at low
resolution or an inadequate frame rate, resulting in
jerky movements.
High-end videoconferencing equipment per-
mits the concurrent transmission of computer
images, whether of digital documents or of Pow-
erPoint or similar electronic slides. In such a case,
the video can be displayed on one screen and the
computer data on another. In the CLCT context,
a remote witness would appear on a large screen
behind the witness stand while the data being dis-
cussed by the witness would be shown to the jury
on their individual flat screen monitors.
Absent such features, document cameras or fax
technology may be used for expeditious two-way
document viewing. Television cameras that show a
picture of any document or object placed below its
television camera can be used to show documents.
The newest major development in videocon-
ferencing is "HD," high definition. High definition
images are detailed enough to allow a judge to see
sweat on the forehead of a witness. HD does re-
quire, however, HD-capable equipment on each
end as well as adequate communication connec-
tions ("bandwidth"). Very high end "telepresence"
solutions such as those available from CISCO are
very close to science fiction in terms of technology
permitting one to feel in the same room as the re-
mote party.
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IP-based video conferencing is increasingly the
type used. If the user has the necessary bandwidth
available for normal law firm or court purposes, for
example, the connection is effectively free. Howev-
er, IP-based videoconferencing may provide vari-
able quality depending upon whether other users
use the same Internet bandwidth for their own
purposes during the video conferencing use. ISDN-
based videoconferencing requires specialized com-
munications lines and can be thought of as costing
about three times the cost of a normal phone call
of the same duration (for a non-HD call) plus the
monthly line subscription cost. ISDN tends to give
a more dependable connection but is being increas-
ingly abandoned in favor of the less expensive IP
method of connection.
Although there are a number of videoconfer-
encing manufacturers, perhaps the best known are
Polycom, Tandberg, and LifeSize, all of which are
CLCT Participating Companies (those that have
equipment installed in CLCT's McGlothlin Court-
room and with which we are familiar). Most people
are familiar with videoconferencing using either
large flat panels or televisions; desktop models are
now available and Polycom now offers an HD unit
that can also serve as a computer monitor.
Personal computer-based videoconferencing
has been in use for some years, but ordinarily we
have not found it to give a good enough picture
for important legal usages in which credibility and
similar factors are critical. We have had good suc-
cess in remote motion experiments with Polycom's
PC-based PVX software solution, except that com-
puter firewall issues may present difficult technical
problems for some users. On September 13, 2008,
our 2008 Center for Legal and Court Technology
Laboratory Trial successfully incorporated quality
remote testimony to the courtroom by an elderly
witness who testified from her retirement commu-
nity apartment using a laptop with the PVX soft-
ware and a standard cable Internet connection.
We believe that this may have been the first time in
history that remote testimony has been given from
a retirement community.
IMPACT ON FACT-FINDERS • Video confer-
encing customarily works well from a technological
perspective. However, its pragmatic and legal utility
have long been controversial. Insofar as the CLCT
has been able to ascertain, remote appearances ap-
pear to be treated by courtroom participants just as
if those persons were physically in the courtroom.
Some years ago we conducted two separate scien-
tifically controlled experiments conducted over two
academic years under the supervision of then Wil-
liam & Mary psychology professor Kelly Shaver.
They demonstrated that in civil personal injury
jury trials in which damage verdicts relied upon the
testimony of medical experts, there was no statisti-
cally significant difference in verdict whether the
experts were physically in the courtroom or else-
where, at least so long as witness images are dis-
played life-size behind the witness stand, and the
witness is subject to cross-examination under oath.
Years of non-controlled experiments in criminal
Laboratory Trials suggest that the same result ap-
plies to merits witnesses in criminal cases.
Even if the William & Mary results are con-
firmed in other experiments, however, there are
questions for which we have no answer. Likely the
most important of these concern the willingness
of remote witnesses to lie when testifying remotely.
We do not know whether the psychological separa-
tion from the courtroom that unavoidably accom-
panies remote testimony affects the willingness to
lie. One of the reasons used to justify remote testi-
mony by abused young children is the need to insu-
late them from the fear that can accompany being
in the same courtroom with the defendant. Does
the same removal affect other witnesses, and if so,
how? Note that although physical absence from the
courtroom might make it easier psychologically to
lie, such an ease does not necessarily mean that a
witness would lie.
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If so, would "confronting" a remote witness
with an immediately present high-resolution image
of the defendant while the witness testifies coun-
teract any effects of the physical absence? In short,
the use of videoconferencing for remote court ap-
pearances, particularly for remote witness testimo-
ny, raises human and potential legal issues not yet
resolved. Although these issues are likely critical for
remote witness testimony, they do not necessarily
affect other forms of remote participation. Our ex-
periments were conducted with conditions such as
the location of the witness being fixed. We do not
know what the consequences would be if they were
to be varied. As a result, our courtroom designs err
on the side of safety by following the design pro-
tocol used in the experiments. At the same time,
we prefer this methodology as a matter of policy
We believe that technology should be as invisible as
possible and should not alter traditional trial prac-
tice if possible. Having a remote witness appear
where the in-court witness sits appears intuitively
desirable.
Happily, these are not significant issues for
many video conferencing uses. They are impor-
tant, however for remote witness testimony.
REMOTE PARTICIPANTS - Most civil and
criminal trial courtroom use of videoconferencing
to date has involved remote witnesses, or in appel-
late cases, remotejudges or counsel. Administrative
hearings such as Social Security disability hearings
have used video conferencing for both remote judg-
es and remote claimants and their representatives.
Past CLCT experiments have made substantial
use of the technology for trial participants gener-
ally. Perhaps the most straightforward use of the
technology is to permit judges or counsel to appear
remotely for motion or other arguments. In 1999,
the CLCT demonstrated how a remote judge could
preside remotely from the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon over a jury trial
in Williamsburg, Virginia. In two United States
federal military appeals cases, United States v. Sala-
zar, 44 MJ. 464 (C.A.A.E 1996), and United States
v. Rockwood, 52 MJ. 98 (C.A.A.E 1999), judges of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces have appeared remotely as part of the
Court's hearing of actual cases in the McGlothlin
Courtroom, a practice that has also been used in
one form or another in at least the Second, Tenth,
and D.C. Circuits, as well as in courts in other na-
tions, such as the High Court of Australia. Video-
conferencing Links Federal Courts and Public, The Third
Branch (June 8th 1998) http://www.uscourts.gov/
ttb/jun98ttb/video.html (10th and D.C. Circuits);
Robin Topping, Hearings Linked By Videoconferencing,
Newsday, Apr. 23, 1997, at A29 (2d Circuit); Mark
Pazniokas, Video Justice Is Catching On In Legal Circles,
Hartford Courant, May 7, 1997, at A3 (2d Cir-
cuit).
One of the most interesting CLCT experimen-
tal uses of videoconferencing was to permit the re-
mote appearance of a prosecutor at trial. The 2001
experimental terrorism CLCT Laboratory Trial,
United States v. Linsor, involved a bombing of a Unit-
ed States military aircraft in England. We assumed
a substantial amount of cooperation from United
Kingdom officials, so much so that it made sense for
a British barrister acting for the prosecution to con-
duct the direct examination of a key government
witness who himself appeared live from Canberra,
Australia. Having filed an appropriate motion with
the Court to permit his appearance, British Barris-
terJeremy Barnett appeared remotely from Leeds
on a 40-inch diagonal flat screen plasma display
placed on the prosecution table and conducted an
outstanding direct and redirect of the defendant's
primary accomplice. His examination was both
professional and successful; the videoconferencing
nature of the examination seemed to have no ad-
verse consequence. Although we consider Mr. Bar-
nett's examination as a successful proof of concept,
in the ordinary case it seems self-evident that coun-
sel will wish to be in the courtroom, even if they
September 2009
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examine a remote witness. This may be subject to
change as society increasingly accommodates it-
self to burgeoning technology, or as sufficient need
arises. Indeed, in the 2005 experimental Labora-
tory Trial, In re Blossom & Blossom, an international
parental child custody trial, our CLCT court and
a Monterrey, Mexico, court agreed to jointly take
evidence from each other in an effort to reach a
common custody result. Counsel, witnesses, and
judges used videoconferencing to connect to each
other's courtroom.
In the 2003 Courtroom 21 Laboratory Trial,
United States v. Stanhope, the prosecution was faced
with a case-determinative proof problem. The de-
fendant had been indicted for trying to finance an
al Qaeda strike in the United States. She had sent
a valuable oil painting to Dubai where it had been
sold to an Australian art collector for a substantial
sum of gold. The gold was effectively converted to
U.S. dollars and transmitted through the Hawala
money transfer system to Cairo, thence to Beirut,
and from Beirut to London and then Berlin. In Ber-
lin the money was conveyed to the United States to
buy a minority interest in a United States firm so
as to support al Qaeda operatives. The prosecution
was able to trace the funds back to Dubai and the
painting from the United States to Dubai. How-
ever, in the absence of the art collector, who had
disappeared, the prosecution could not connect the
painting and the money. The art collector, however,
had sought legal advice from his Australian solici-
tor while they were both in London and had fully
communicated all of the necessary evidentiary de-
tails to the lawyer. If the prosecution could obtain
the testimony of the lawyer, the art collector's state-
ment would be admissible as a declaration against
interest under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
The lawyer claimed the attorney-client privilege
under Australian, British, and United States law.
With the lawyer in a United States district court
courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence would
have applied, likely without any application of for-
eign law, as the law of the forum ordinarily gov-
erns privileges. However, we assumed that we were
unable to extradite the lawyer, either as a legal or
practical matter. Without the ability to compel tes-
timony in the United States, we were left with the
need to comply with foreign law. The Australian
lawyer would testify if the Australian and British
courts determined that he could do so without vio-
lating his duty as a lawyer. Accordingly, we held the
first known three-court concurrent hearing. Using
the CLCT Tandberg videoconferencing systems,
the courtroom was connected to Queensland,
Australia, and Leeds, England. The prosecution
argued Australian law to Australia, English law to
England, and the Federal Rules of Evidence to the
presiding judge in Williamsburg, the Honorable
James Spencer, United States DistrictJudge for the
Eastern District of Virginia. After all three courts
ruled seriatim that the respective national privilege
did not apply (using what amounted to a crime/
fraud exception), in Queensland the lawyer was
directed to testify and did so remotely to Williams-
burg. Although the probability of such a hearing in
the near future seems unlikely, it is indeed possible,
and videoconferencing appears to be the most use-
ful way of accommodating the varied practical,
legal, and political issues involved. In Stanhope, no
judge sat outside his or her own court, let alone na-
tion. Although the time zones were extremely both-
ersome, especially for our Australian colleagues,
the hearing was far more efficient than any other
mechanism that we could envision. As we increas-
ingly are forced to deal with courts abroad, particu-
larly the courts of allied nations, hearings similar
to the one we held in Stanhope may be highly desir-
able.
THE LEGAL SITUATION FOR REMOTE
WITNESS TESTIMONY - The most wide-
spread and accepted use of videoconferencing in
the courtroom is remote witness testimony. Au-
thorized in federal civil cases by Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 43(a), remote testimony has been
used in state and federal courts in the United States
and courts abroad, especially in Australia. See, e.g,
Chief Justice M.E.J. Black, A Court-Based National
Videoconferencing Network for Taking Evidence and Aid-
ing in Administration, presentation during The First
Worldwide Common Law Judiciary Conference
(May 29, 1995). It has also seen successful use in
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia. Information Technology in An Inter-
national Criminal Court, a videotape presented at
the 2002 Australian Institute of Judicial Adminis-
tration 3rd AIJA Technology forJustice Conference
by the Honorable David Hunt, of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (on
file with the Courtroom 21 Project). See also Sanja
Kutnjak Ivkovic, Justice by the International Criminal
Tibunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 37 Stan. J. Int'l L.
255, 286 (2001) ("The ICTY in the Tadic case, for
example, ... provided eleven witnesses with the
opportunity to testify via videoconferencing from
a location in the former Yugoslavia"). Its use in
American criminal cases, however, has been con-
troversial.
Defense Testimony
Because the Bill of Rights protects defendants
against government action, there is no Constitu-
tional prohibition on remote defense testimony In
any jurisdiction, however, there may be a court rule
or statutory constraint. Both the utility and diffi-
culty of such testimony can be seen from the trial
in Commonwealth v. Malvo.
Malvo was the capital trial of the younger of
the two "Washington snipers." Charged with mur-
der "in the commission of an act of terrorism,"
Malvo's prospects for a favorable verdict were dim.
The evidence against him was overwhelming. In
addition to attempting to counter the prosecution's
case in chief on the merits, the defense needed to
present especially probative evidence on capital
sentencing if it was to avoid a death sentence. The
defense sought to call a very large number of wit-
nesses. Early in the case the trial judge suggested
that many of the witnesses might best testify via
videoconferencing. The defense adopted thejudge's
suggestion and formally proposed the taking of tes-
timony from 25 or more witnesses. The witnesses
were to be located primarily in Antigua, Jamaica,
Washington State, and Louisiana. Most, but not
all, would be mitigation sentencing witnesses, and
a number would replace the defense-proposed use
of videotaped deposition/statement evidence pre-
viously opposed by the prosecution. The Fairfax
Circuit Court is a Courtroom 21 Court Affiliate.
(CLCT was originally named the Courtroom 21
Project, a name still used for courtroom purposes,
including the Courtroom 21 Court Affiliates.) The
Clerk's Office appointed CLCT to serve as Execu-
tive Agent to determine the feasibility of remote
testimony and, should the court so order it, to im-
plement it.
Initial CLCT actions proceeded on concurrent
tracks: determining whether such testimony was
technologically, logistically, and financially pos-
sible, and whether foreign testimony could be law-
fully obtained. The first concern, although highly
time-consuming, was straightforward and eventu-
ally yielded a determination of practicality and fi-
nancial savings. Remote locations were located in
federal court facilities in the United States and po-
tentially adequate commercial facilities were locat-
ed in Antigua and Jamaica. CLCT Deputy Direc-
tor for Courtroom Design and Technology Martin
Gruen and I surveyed the Chesapeake Courthouse
and determined what would need to be done to
implement videoconferencing in the courtroom.
We determined a probable minimum cost savings
of $12,539.26 over the cost of transporting to Vir-
ginia those witnesses able to travel, a financial sav-
ings that did not address the fact that a number of
potential witnesses, including Malvo's mother, were
not necessarily able to travel to testify. Letter from
Chancellor Professor of Law & Director, Court-
September 2009
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room 21 Fredric I. Lederer to The Honorable Jane
Marum Roush, Fairfax Circuit Court (October 15,
2003)(originally available at http://www.co.fairfax.
va.us/courts/cases/pdf/r_ 101603other.pd).
The second proved to be quite interesting. Be-
cause the Antigua and Jamaica witnesses were not
in the United States, obtaining permission for them
to testify was a diplomatic matter. As the Office of
International Affairs of the Department of Justice's
Criminal Division assists only prosecutors in ob-
taining evidence abroad in support of our Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaties, we were left to other de-
vices to obtain that testimony even though we were
seeking the evidence on behalf of the court in the
interest of expediting trial and lowering its cost to
the taxpayer. We contacted and obtained support
from the State Department, which was prepared
to obtain permission from the foreign governments
involved and, if necessary, to ensure the presence
of a consular officer when the testimony was taken.
The issue of where the oath was to be administered
was raised by State Department representatives, an
issue for which we had no adequate answer. We
could potentially have had the oath administered
remotely from Virginia, a consular official could
have administered it in the originating location, or
both. Because the evidence was to be presented by
the defense, we assumed that the oath issues, how-
ever important, would in actuality be moot as the
defense would be unable to assert error should the
case go to appeal. Whether the testimony would be
lawful under Virginia law was not a matter within
our concern, although it may well have proven the
determinative issue.
Ultimately, the prosecution opposed the defense
request. The judge then ruled against the defense
request for remote testimony stating, among other
matters, that she would not grant the motion over
government objection.
Upon reflection, I believe that the Malvo case il-
lustrates some of the critical issues raised by remote
testimony in criminal cases generally. The threshold
issue is its very legality. Ordinarily, debate about the
legality of remote testimony centers on its constitu-
tionality under the Sixth Amendment. That issue is
moot if the court is estopped by statute from per-
mitting the testimony, although such a statute may
raise compulsory process issues. A review of Vir-
ginia's statutory law suggests that there is no affir-
mative statutory authority for such testimony. Such
law as has been enacted could reasonably be read
to prohibit it. Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-3.1, Personal
appearance by two-way electronic video and audio
communication; standards ("Where an appearance
is required or permitted before a magistrate, intake
officer, or, prior to trial, before a judge, the appear-
ance may be by ... use of two-way electronic video
and audio communication"); Va. Code Ann. § 17.1-
513.2, Use of telephonic communication systems
or electronic video and audio communication sys-
tems to conduct hearing ( ... in any civilproceeding...
the court may, in its discretion, conduct any hear-
ing using ... an electronic audio and video com-
munication system to provide for the appearance
of any parties and witnesses)(emphasis added). The
judge's decision not to permit the remote testimo-
ny in large part because of the government's op-
position raises an interesting question. As the court
failed to specify her reasons in greater detail it is
unclear whether the decision was on policy or eq-
uitable grounds or whether she had considered any
potential legal error as moot when the request was
a defense one and unopposed by the prosecution.
Accordingly, remote testimony for any criminal
case, terrorism or not, is dependent at the very least
upon the absence of a prohibitive statute or rule.
Without such legal authority, the issue is at least
left to the court's discretion. Far better would be
affirmative authority similar either to Fed. R. Civ.
P 43(a) or the more comprehensive authority found
in other jurisdictions such as Victoria, Australia.
Victoria Evidence (Audio Visual and Audio Link-
ing) Act 1997 section 3 (Act No. 4/1997, Victoria,
Australia) inserting into the Evidence Act 1958,
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new section 42G. The legality of the witness oath is
a matter of consequence. In the absence of treaty,
there is no clear way to know whether an oath is
legally valid in the sense that a prosecution for per-
jury may result. Is a crime committed when one
perjures oneself in one country while testifying in
a trial in another? Whose law has been violated?
And do we care about the probability that a for-
eign nation would actually prosecute? In the semi-
nal case in this area, State v. Harrell, 709 So.2d 1364
(Fla.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 903 (1998), the Florida
Supreme Court held that the treaty between the
United States and Argentina permitted the po-
tential extradition to the United States for trial of
Argentine witnesses testifying by two-way satellite
against a Florida defendant. Id. at 1371. The Flori-
da Supreme Court opined that perjury was punish-
able under both Florida and Argentine law. It is not
entirely clear that the respective statutes punishing
false statements in each jurisdiction necessarily ex-
tended to a false statement in Argentina made inci-
dent to a criminal trial in another nation.
Note that these questions arise even when it is
the defense that is attempting to use remote testi-
mony. Given the usual posture of such evidence
attempts, it seemed ironic to have the prosecution
oppose remote testimony for fear that it could not
adequately cross-examine the remote witness, pres-
ent adequate witness demeanor to the jury, or be
aware of potential witness tampering abroad -
claims one ordinarily hears from the defense. This
raises one of the key questions about such testi-
mony: Should it ever be used? At the same time, I
would note that of the real concerns (witness tam-
pering does not seem to be one; it can take place
anywhere), technology can cope with almost all
of them. The one critical concern that appears to
be beyond our ability to adequately ascertain is, as
previously discussed, whether remote testimony is
more likely to yield intentionally false testimony. As
we seem to be unable to be able to tell even with
in-court witnesses who are telling the truth as they
know it and who are not, we do not even have a
baseline for this determination.
Interestingly, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit has summarily rejected an attack on remote
testimony in a civil case because of the oath issue.
El-Hadad v. United Arab Emirates, 496 E3d 658, 668-
69 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1872
(2008).
Before returning to the more usual prosecu-
tion use of such evidence, it is worthwhile to briefly
examine the one area in which an attempt by the
defense to use remote testimony is constitution-
ally unique, the Constitution's compulsory process
clause.
Sixth Amendment Compulsory
Process Clause
The Compulsory Process Clause provides sim-
ply that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor...." In Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), the Supreme
Court held the clause to be sufficient to override
a state prohibition on declarations against inter-
est when on the facts of the case the evidence was
probative and necessary. Although it may as yet
be premature to argue that Chambers gives rise to a
generalized right to present probative evidence for
a criminal defendant, such a claim is not unreason-
able. If remote testimony is sufficiently probative
and trustworthy, the defense ought to have a consti-
tutional right to it, even if barred by rule or statute.
Indeed, in Malvo, the defense argued compulsory
process as a ground for the proposed remote testi-
mony. When the judge asked counsel whether he
was arguing that she might have a duty to provide
remote testimony from anywhere in the world when
otherwise justified, he ducked the question in favor
of a response based on the court's likely financial
savings. His better answer would have been "Yes."
If the defense has a legitimate need for evidence
and that evidence is available, in a system that pays
26 1 The Practical Litigator September 2009
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for witness travel, there seems to be no reason to
reject remote testimony, especially if the result is to
either entirely foreclose obtaining the evidence or
to present it through the more expensive and less
useful means of a deposition.
Proposed defense use of remote testimony is
believed to be relatively rare. Given the option, the
prosecution likely would be a more frequent user,
but the prosecution must face the Sixth Amend-
ment's Confrontation Clause.
Remote Prosecution Testimony
The usual intended use of remote testimony in
a criminal case is to supply prosecution evidence.
One can reasonably assume that this would be the
norm for many cases, especially terrorism cases in-
volving foreign witnesses. The complicated nature
of major cases also suggests that there may be need
for distant witnesses who are called to testify only
very briefly to lay pro forma evidentiary founda-
tions. In the Mc Veigh case, for example, 27 witness-
es who testified during the morning session were
phone company employees flown in from around
the country to authenticate hundreds of pages of
phone records, each testifying for only a few min-
utes. One witness was on the stand for just 50 sec-
onds. Michael Fleeman, Mc Veigh Phone Trial Retraced
Prosecutors Call 27 to Recount Calls for Explosives, Rental
Truck, Pittsburgh Post Gazette, May 8, 1997, at A8.
This might better be done by remote testimony
that could result in large cost savings while mini-
mizing the inconvenience caused to the witnesses.
The fundamental question in this area is wheth-
er prosecution-proffered remote witness testimony
can or should be received in evidence. Remote
testimony has been attacked as an inadequate sub-
stitute for in-court physical testimony. Concerns
range from the already noted issue of the effect of
physical absence from the courtroom influencing
truth-telling to the inability to determine demean-
or to the expressed critical need for the witness to
face the defendant in open court. These are impor-
tant concerns and in light of them no one, to the
best of my knowledge, has seriously suggested the
routine use of remote testimony in criminal cases
- although the Supreme Court's 2009 decision
that prosecution use of forensic laboratory reports
violates the Confrontation Clause, Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), would justify
remote analyst testimony if that proved constitu-
tional. What has been suggested is a criminal ana-
log to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a). When
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure issued its major rules amend-
ment recommendations in 2002, it recommended
that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 be
amended to add proposed Rule 26(b):
"In the interest of justice, the court may authorize
contemporaneous, two-way video presentation in
open court of testimony from a witness who is at a
different location if:
(1) the requesting party establishes exceptional cir-
cumstances for such transmission;
(2) appropriate safeguards for the transmission are
used; and
(3) the witness is unavailable within the meaning of
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4)-(5)."
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/cour-
torders/frcr02p.pdf.
In its notes, the committee favorably compared
the use of remote testimony to traditional deposi-
tion evidence. Id. A criminal deposition ordinarily
permits the accused to be present in the same room
with the witness. In an unusual although not un-
precedented act, the Supreme Court, with Justices
Breyer and O'Connor dissenting, refused to trans-
mit the proposed rule to Congress. InsteadJustice
Scalia opined:
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'As we made clear in [Maryland v. ]Craig ... , a pur-
pose of the Confrontation Clause is ordinarily to
compel accusers to make their accusations in the
defendant's presence - which is not equivalent to
making them in a room that contains a television
set beaming electrons that portray the defendant's
image. Virtual confrontation might be sufficient to
protect virtual constitutional rights; I doubt wheth-
er it is sufficient to protect real ones."
http: //www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/cour-
torders/frcr02p.pdf.
The Court's failure to forward the Rule simply
deprived the federal courts of affirmative authori-
zation for remote testimony, leaving United States
district judges to make case-by-case individual de-
cisions when remote testimony is proposed. The
Court's action, however, clearly signals the severe
doubts held by many of its members as to at least
the desirability of remote testimony.
In State v. Harrell, supra, the Supreme Court
of Florida held that neither the state nor federal
Constitution prohibited remote testimony by the
eyewitness victims of the crime when they testified
against the defendant by two-way satellite televi-
sion from Argentina. The Court found sufficient
necessity, reliability, and precautions to have been
present and provided guidance for future cases:
"We are mindful of the possible difficulty in de-
termining when the satellite procedure should be
employed. We are also aware of the possibility that
such a procedure can be abused. Therefore, we are
establishing the following guidelines to aid in mak-
ing this decision. The determination is not simply
a mathematical calculation, based on the number
of alleged public policy interests or state interests.
Rather, the proper approach for determining when
the satellite procedure is appropriate involves a
finding similar to that of rule 3.190(j) of the Flori-
da Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 3.1900) pro-
vides the circumstances under which and the pro-
cedure by which a party can take a deposition to
perpetuate testimony for those witnesses that are
found to be unavailable. ...
"Thus, in all future criminal cases where one of
the parties makes a motion to present testimony
via satellite transmission, it is incumbent upon the
party bringing the motion to (1) verify or support
by the affidavits of credible persons that a prospec-
tive witness resides beyond the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the court or may be unable to attend or
be prevented from attending a trial or hearing and
(2) establish that the witness's testimony is material
and necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Upon
such a showing, the trial judge shall allow for the
satellite procedure.
"...However, some important caveats exist in
regards to the oath, cross-examination, and ob-
servation of the witness's demeanor. First, an oath
is only effective if the witness can be subjected to
prosecution for perjury upon making a knowingly
false statement. ... To ensure that the possibility of
perjury is not an empty threat for those witnesses
that testify via satellite from outside the United
States, it must be established that there exists an ex-
tradition treaty between the witness's country and
the United States, and that such a treaty permits
extradition for the crime of perjury....
"We also acknowledge that possible audio and
visual problems can develop with satellite transmis-
sion. It is incumbent upon the trial judge to moni-
tor such problems and to halt the procedure if
these problems threaten the reliability of the cross-
examination or the observation of the witness's de-
meanor."
Id. at 709 So.2d 1370-72.
Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit, having sustained
Harrell's conviction in Harrell v. Butterworth, 251
E3d 926 (11 th Cir. 2001), held unconstitutional on
direct appeal the conviction of a federal defendant
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at whose trial two prosecution witnesses testified by
video conferencing from Australia. In an en banc
opinion, a majority of the court in United States
v. rates, 438 E3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)(en banc)
soundly condemned remote prosecution testimony
as violating the confrontation clause. The federal
courts are divided on whether remote testimony
can satisfy the confrontation clause. Compare, e.g.,
United States v. Gigante, 166 E3d 75 (2d Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1114 (2000) (sustaining use)
with United States v. rates, supra and United States v.
Bordeaux, 400 E3d 548 (8th Cir. 2005).
More recenty, the Fourth Circuit sustained the
legality of a live two-way videoconferenced deposi-
tion conducted from Saudi Arabia to Virginia in a
terrorism case. United States v. AbuAli, 528 E3d 210
(4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009):
'A live, two-way video link was used to transmit the
proceedings to a courtroom in Alexandria. This
permitted Abu Ali and one of his attorneys to see
and hear the testimony contemporaneously; it also
allowed the Mabahith officers to see and hear Abu
Ali as he testified. A court reporter in Alexandria
transcribed the testimony in real time, and both
the witnesses and Abu Ali were videotaped during
the depositions, so that the jury could see their re-
actions. The trial court presided over the deposi-
tion testimony of the Mabahith officials from the
courtroom in Alexandria, ruling on objections as
they arose. Furthermore, Abu Ali was able to com-
municate via cell phone with his defense counsel
in Saudi Arabia during the frequent breaks in the
proceedings. In addition, the court was willing to
stop the depositions if Abu Ali's counsel in Saudi
Arabia wanted to consult with their client."
Id. at 528 E3d 239
At footnote 12 of the opinion, the court distin-
guished rates on the grounds both that the 11 th Cir-
cuit's decision was the result of the district court's
lack of a finding of necessity for the remote testi-
mony and that its case, unlike Yates, involved nation-
al security. A prosecutor arguing for use of remote
government testimony can argue two differing po-
sitions: that modern remote testimony satisfies the
Sixth Amendment confrontation clause per se or
that on the specific facts of the case there is suffi-
cientjustification for the procedure, citing Maryland
v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 850 (1990) and its require-
ment that "denial of such confrontation is neces-
sary to further an important public policy and only
where the reliability of the testimony is otherwise
assured." Abu-Ali, supra, at 528 E3d 242.
It is worth noting that absent videoconferencing,
the testimony of unavailable witnesses in a crimi-
nal case may be had only by deposition or hearsay.
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford
v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), prohibits pros-
ecutorial use of "testimonial hearsay," it does not
ban other forms of hearsay. Presumably, live cross-
examination of a remote witness under oath, com-
plete with demeanor evidence, would be superior
to hearsay.
CONCLUSION • Videoconferencing is improving
constantly. State-of-the-art "telepresence" installa-
tions can almost duplicate being in a room with a
distant participant. At some point, it will be difficult
even to realize that a law firm colleague, opposing
counsel at a settlement meeting, or remote hearing
participant, isn't within a few physical feet. We are
in a transition stage in which our legal system has
not yet fully adapted to even the present realities
of videoconferencing, let alone what is to come. At
some point we will have to decide when, if ever,
physical presence is truly mandated and, as tech-
nology improves, why.
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